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DUST BOWL HISTORIOGRAPHY 
HARRY C. McDEAN 
In the late 1930s, Undersecretary of Agricul-
ture Milburn Lincoln Wilson organized "T rav-
elling Great Plains Schools," culminating three 
decades of research and reform work in the 
Great Plains. The schools brought hundreds of 
rural social scientists together with scores of 
federal and state policymakers. The schools 
were broken into two sections, one dedicated 
to the southern Plains and the other to the 
northern. Those who attended spent several 
weeks making their way through the Plains, 
with care taken to differentiate problems 
particular to each of the two regions. In the 
southern Plains, the school spent several days 
examining the problems specific to the Dust 
Bowl area that Wilson's staff clearly delineated 
on maps provided the students. As the maps 
showed, the term Dust Bowl designated a 
specific region in the Great Plains, including 
northeastern New Mexico, southeastern Colo-
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rado, southwestern Kansas, and the panhan-
dles of Texas and Oklahoma.! 
The schools were aided by agronomists, 
who demonstrated to the students the differ-
ence between the soils in the Dust Bowl and 
those found elsewhere in the Plains. Here were 
soil groups whose configuration was distinc-
tive: most notably, the Dust Bowl had exten-
sive reddish-chestnut soils that bordered upon 
brown soils. Although both soil groups were 
susceptible to depletion, erosion, and blowing, 
the reddish-chestnut soils were especially sensi-
tive to cultural mistreatment. 
At the schools historians and rural sociol-
ogists also informed the students of their 
research in the Dust Bowl. The work of Jesse 
T. Sanders, Robert T. McMillan, and Otis 
Duncan in the social and the agricultural 
history of the Dust Bowl especially explained 
why its soils were mistreated and how that 
mistreatment generated the great dust storms 
of the 1930s. Although this history was 
complex, the students learned how cultural 
traits of Dust Bowl residents encouraged 
excesses by many of its farmers in the 1920s. 
For while other Great Plains farmers worked 
radically to revise their farm operations in 
order to conserve the soil, those in the Dust 
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Bowl area thoughtlessly devised dry farming 
techniques that allowed them to put under the 
plow those soils with high susceptibility to 
windblowing. As a result, new dry farming 
techniques were applied in the 1920s, destroy-
ing the natural, regenerative process that had 
kept Dust Bowl soils fertile and intact. 2 
Students also learned from the social 
scientists that the application of the new 
destructive farming techniques was furthered 
by several socioeconomic phenomena peculiar 
to the Dust Bowl in the 1920s. One was the 
tendency of townsfolk to buy or lease raw land 
and use the new dry farming techniques to 
cultivate it. They planned to farm only as long 
as it was profitable to do so, hoping that all 
would go well. Another farming development 
distinctive to the Dust Bowl area in the 1920s 
was the migratory nature of much of its 
population. Wage and day laborers routinely 
took up tenant farming during slack times. 
Viewing such "farming" as interim employ-
ment, they were willing to farm land that was 
susceptible to depletion. Although they did 
not destroy the land wherever they went-for 
they ranged into plains areas whose soil was 
not so sensitive and routinely wandered into 
non-plains states like Arkansas-they helped 
to create the farming culture that violated the 
tenuous soils of the Dust Bowl. 
Social scientists like Duncan, Sanders, and 
McMillan provided the students of the schools 
with several possible reasons why these devel-
opments were peculiar to the Dust Bowl area 
during the 1920s. One was that only in the 
southern Plains was there considerable part-
time mining, lumbering, and oil work available 
in the 1920s-hence the migratory nature of 
much of its population. Because this transient 
population felt no sense of permanence or 
belonging, it expressed little interest in the 
application of soil conservation measures de-
signed to create a permanently successful farm 
population in the region. Another reason was 
that other Great Plains states had opened their 
land to cultivation in an earlier day and those 
settling it had failed and abandoned their land 
during the great northern plains drought of 
the 1917-23 era. Hence, northern plains 
townsfolk already knew what their coun-
terparts in the Dust Bowl region would learn 
in the 1930s-that farming of sensitive soil 
groups can have disastrous consequences dur-
ing times of drought. 
The goal of the "Travelling Great Plains 
Schools" was to pinpoint problems specific to 
precise areas within the Plains and to suggest 
resolutions to them. Since they were traveling 
schools, subsequent meetings were organized. 
These brought together leading economists, 
farm management experts, historians, rural 
social scientists, meteorologists, climatologists, 
astronomers, astrophysicists, geologists, ecol-
ogists, dendrochronologists, anthropologists, 
archaeologists, and geographers. Their mission 
was to study "to what extent science can 
produce a program for land use" in specific 
areas of the Plains, "which, if put into opera-
tion, will bring harmony between man and 
nature."l 
The extent to which these experts suc-
ceeded in this mission is difficult to assess. 
Indeed, the question provides the subject of 
lively debate among modern scholars, especial-
ly historians, who write on the Dust Bowl. Yet, 
in spite of the robustness of the debate, 
modern Dust Bowl historians have accurately 
captured in their works most of the aforemen-
tioned facts about the Dust Bowl. Unfortu-
nately, one cannot say the same about some of 
those who write survey textbooks in American 
history, for they fail to grasp even the most 
elementary facts about the Dust Bowl. 
As a result, modern Dust Bowl history is 
schizophrenic. Even the most basic character-
istic of the Dust Bowl-its geographic bound-
ary-has two different compositions. The 
textbook writers locate the Dust Bowl in a 
variety of places where the Dust Bowl history 
books do not: in the Great Plains generally, or 
in states outside the Plains, or often anywhere 
that the dust blew in the thirties. Most 
commonly, these writers locate the Dust Bowl 
by backtracking the "Okies" to their origins, at 
least insofar as they were described by John 
Steinbeck in The Grapes of Wrath. 4 
Such inaccurate and vague boundary de-
scriptions become more pronounced when the 
textbook writers seem automatically to asso-
ciate drought conditions with the Dust Bowl. 
Bernard Bailyn and associates tell their readers 
that improved prices for farm goods in the 
mid-1930s were "caused by a cruel drought on 
the Great Plains, choking the farmers in vast 
clouds of topsoil that swept across the region." 
Others say that the drought and its corre-
sponding dust storms were even more per-
vasive. Stephen Thernstrom contends that 
farm price increases in the mid-thirties "were 
partly the result of the great droughts and 
windstorms and turned many wheat fields into 
little Saharas." Arthur Link and associates 
never find a Dust Bowl in their text, contend-
ing instead that "a severe drought in the 
Middle West and Southwest cooperated with 
the AAA to reduce farm production." More 
surprising is the text of George B. Tindall, 
which covers with precision the regional 
planning aspects of the New Deal, but fails to 
find a Dust Bowl. Indeed, in the absence of 
any appraisal of this area, he contends that the 
creation of the Soil Conservation Service in 
1935 "went far to heal the scars of erosion and 
the plague of dust storms," wherever they 
were.' 
Obviously, these historians live in a differ-
ent world from that of M. L. Wilson. They 
seem to view Great Plains regions differently 
than either Wilson or the specialists in Dust 
Bowl history. Worse yet, these same historians 
miss the most important point made by both 
contemporary social scientists of the 1930s and 
recent Dust Bowl historians-that the Dust 
Bowl was not a natural disaster; it was a 
disaster caused by what people did to nature. 
Although every old-timer in the Great 
Plains realizes that dust has blown there since 
only God knows when, both the contempo-
rary rural social scientists and recent Dust 
Bowl historians have shown that a special set 
of conditions caused the dust to blow massive-
ly during one particular time in an exact 
location. The intent of their work, in fact, was 
to reveal the complexity of natural, human, 
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and technical events that combined to cause 
the great dust storms in the Dust Bowl. 
Clearly, our textbook writers are ignorant of 
their conclusions. Why is this? There are 
several possible explanations. 
One reason might be that they have been 
deceived by books or articles that have Dust 
Bowl in their titles but whose texts cover other 
subject matter. One such study was favorably 
reviewed in spite of its misleading title: Walter 
Stein's California and the Dust Bowl Migration. 6 
Stein neither tells his reader where the Dust 
Bowl region was nor does he distinguish its 
problems or its migrants from those in the 
other areas. To add to the mystery, Stein 
contends that the migration was but part of a 
larger migration from the Great Plains which 
began in the 1920s. To him, "The Great Plains 
tier of the United States embraces five states 
from the Dakotas on the north to Texas on the 
South."; One wonders which of the remaining 
seven Great Plains states are recognized as 
such by Stein. Stein also views the migrants 
from a perspective different from that of 
contemporary rural social scientists and recent 
Dust Bowl historians. For although he con-
cedes that the dust storms were "a man-made 
catastrophe," he sees a network of natural, 
economic, technical, and political conditions 
converging to create victims-poor, de-
fenseless, Dust Bowl migrants who fled to 
California. S In fact, it was Stein's and Stein-
beck's "victims" who did the victimizing; at 
least some of them helped form the farming 
culture that created the ecological disaster 
called the Dust Bowl. 
In defense of Stein and more certainly of 
Steinbeck, one must understand that their 
works appeared before most of the recent 
histories on the Dust Bowl were published. 
Although these two authors could not benefit 
from that research, our recent textbook writers 
could have. Why have these historians failed 
to balance off the work of Stein and Steinbeck 
against these recently published Dust Bowl 
histories? Perhaps their inability to do so stems 
from misperceptions about the region encour-
aged by the specialists' varied approaches to it. 
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For example, most historical treatments of 
the drought of the 1930s fail to distinguish the 
Dust Bowl from other drought areas. Here, 
historians of the drought tend to lump all 
problems, issues, policies, and programs into 
one package and treat them as a whole. 
Therefore, for anyone but a specialist in Great 
Plains studies, reading such work can only 
suggest that any conclusions that apply in one 
area of the Plains necessarily apply in another. 
Several otherwise superior articles on the 
drought in the thirties encourage the thought 
that wherever one looks in the Great Plains 
one encounters similar problems and issues. C. 
Robert Lambert's "The Drought Cattle Pur-
chase, 1934-35: Problems and Complaints," 
Van L. Perkins's, "New Dealers and the 
Drought of 1934," and Mary Hargreaves's, 
"Land-Use Planning in Response to Drought: 
The Experience of the Thirties" -all stress the 
federal policies designed to meet problems 
widespread in the drought areas at the expense 
of highlighting problems peculiar to specific 
areas in the Plains.' 
Of course, this tendency has been coun-
terbalanced by work that does distinguish the 
problems of particular areas in the Plains. For 
example, as early as 1969, Theodore Saloutos, 
in his article "The New Deal and Farm Policy 
in the Great Plains," notes that "In the Dust 
Bowl of the southern Great Plains there was a 
great need for checking wind erosion, especial-
lyon nuisance lands owned by absentee 
owners."I" Still, Saloutos's work and that of 
others suffers from the possibility of misinter-
pretation. I I True, these works do distinguish 
clearly the areas in the Plains that they are 
about. Yet their purpose was to examine the 
origins and the character of broad federal 
policies and programs in the Great Plains. 
Thus it is fair to say that recent "drought" and 
Great Plains histories tend to dim the distinc-
tive features in the Dust Bowl. 
But there is yet another possible reason 
why our textbook writers misunderstand the 
Dust Bowl. Perhaps it is because the bias of 
some Dust Bowl historians has helped create 
misperceptions about it in the minds of the 
textbook writers. 
In fact, a major misconception of Stein and 
Steinbeck provides the basis upon which Paul 
Bonnifield-the author of the first of three 
major histories on the Dust Bowl to appear in 
recent years-builds his work. I2 Although this 
book should not misguide anyone interested in 
the region's boundaries (it provides accurate 
maps of the area), it advances vigorously one 
of Stein's misinterpretations: that those who 
left the Dust Bowl were victims of government 
policy. It even goes beyond Stein to maintain 
that those who remained in the Dust Bowl 
were also victimized by the government. This 
prejudice against the policies of the federal 
government is argued in an unusual but 
nonetheless compelling way. Bonnifield main-
tains there is ample evidence to indicate that, 
had the migrants not been forced off their 
farms by government policy, they would have 
worked out farming systems to prevent future 
Dust Bowls while earning standards of living 
comparable to those of other Americans. 
Bonnifield's approach is intriguing. He 
begins by showing his readers that not only is 
drought commonplace in the history of the 
Plains, but so is the dust storm. Bonnifield 
dates dust storms back to the 1850s, noting 
that the editor of the Kansas Free State believed 
there was a "normal blowing season" in 
Kansas that "makes anyone exposed to it as 
'sooty' as a collier." In discussing subsequent 
droughts and dust-blowing situations in the 
true Dust Bowl region, Bonnifield shows that 
those who didn't leave the region "adapted to 
the new conditions and continued their busi-
ness." Moreover, there always existed "a few 
hardy souls who moved in to continue the task 
of opening the country."I; 
With this stage in Dust Bowl history set in 
place, Bonnifield is able to uncover a historical 
plot. Arguing that "hard times were not new 
to the old-timers," Bonnifield shows how in 
the 1930s Dust Bowl "farmers were making 
genuine efforts to meet the crisis caused by 
wind and drought." He finds farmers like 
Charles T. Peacock, who designed a machine 
that formed "a lister row and placed check 
dams at regular intervals." These and similar 
farm innovations demonstrate, says Bonni-
field, that "the people of the dust bowl were 
not defeated, poverty-ridden people without 
hope. They were builders for tomorrow. 
During those hard years they continued to 
build their churches, their businesses, their 
schools, their colleges, their communities. 
They grew closer to God and fonder of the 
land. Hard years were common in their past, 
but the future belonged to those who were 
ready to seize the moment."!4 
Given these conditions and attitudes, why 
then did anyone leave the Dust Bowl? Because 
"despite statements to the contrary, the federal 
government was involved in removal and steps 
were being taken to force people out. It was 
planned to return the majority of the land to 
grazing under government control." And who 
specifically designed this plot? Apparently, the 
schemers were Lewis C. Gray of the National 
Resources Board, Hugh Bennett of the Soil 
Conservation Service, and M. L. Wilson of the 
USDA. Bonnifield particularly blames Wilson 
who, as undersecretary of agriculture, "had 
several years' experience in promoting his 
program [and] was in a position to carry out 
his concept of rational land-use program on a 
grand scale."!5 
What was Wilson's most lethal weapon in 
the scheme? The Soil Conservation Districts 
Act, which, says Bonnifield, the farmers in the 
Dust Bowl viewed as a "scheme of reorganizing 
their society and drastically changing their 
land ownership." The result, he said, was that 
"they dealt a big blow to the scheme . . . by 
voting down the proposed Soil Conservation 
Districts." This was important, says Bonni-
field, in part because it was the chief weapon in 
Wilson's arsenal to redesign life in the Dust 
Bowl. The districts, had they been created, 
would also have given the Soil Conservation 
Service greater power in the Dust Bowl, and 
no sensible farmer wanted that. It would have 
been particularly bad, says Bonnifield, because 
"not a single new implement or technique of 
preventing wind erosion was developed by the 
Soil Conservation Service." What farmer 
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would want to work with that organization? 
More important, "the advancements by the 
farmers in developing new implements and 
techniques were not emulated by the Soil 
Conservation Service." Finally, their methods 
were costly.!6 
Anyone who finds Bonnifield's conclusions 
convincing is cautioned to read other recently 
published articles and books on the Dust Bowl 
as well as studies from the thirties.!7 Should 
Bonnifield himself read this body of work, he 
would then understand that Wilson believed 
that federal, state, and local experts needed to 
work closely with local farmers to recognize 
and resolve problems specific to their farm 
area. To the extent there was any grand design 
in the Soil Conservation Districts Act, that 
was it. 
Bonnifield's conspiracy theory aside, the 
strength in his book builds from its detailed 
discussion of how "the farmers did take 
unnecessary chances and in general were 
careless about protection against wind ero-
sion" in the Dust Bowl. In spite of the 
advances in "scientific dryland farming [that] 
were designed to conserve moisture," Bonni-
field shows why "the dry surface of moist soil 
will blow" anyway. Therefore, to stop the 
blowing "it was necessary to develop tech-
niques and technology aimed specifically at 
wind erosion."!8 Thus, even the harshest critic 
of New Deal planning agrees with other recent 
Dust Bowl historians on one point: the great 
Dust Bowl of the thirties was created by 
people, not by drought and wind. 
Although Donald Worster's history of the 
Dust Bowl, the second of three major books to 
appear in recent years, agrees with Bonnifield 
on this one point, it does so for reasons that 
stem from a bias antithetical to Bonnifield's.!9 
It is Worster's belief that the Dust Bowl grew 
out of, and was worsened by, the inability or 
unwillingness of the federal government to 
curtail the exploitive tendencies of capitalist 
farmers. 
It is possible that Worster's bias unwittingly 
contributed to our textbook writers' miscon-
ception of the Dust Bowl. For all the merits of 
122 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SPRING 1986 
his book, which won the Bancroft Prize, 
Worster blurs the distinctiveness of the Dust 
Bowl region through his strenuous effort to 
convince his reader that American culture 
created the people who make Dust Bowls. As 
Worster puts it, there "are ecological values 
taught by the capitalist ethos." These values, 
he says, created the Dust Bowl. "It came about 
because the expansionary energy of the United 
States had finally encountered a volatile, 
marginal land, destroying the delicate ecologi-
cal balance that had evolved there." What did 
it was not the people's plows, but their "social 
system, a set of values, an economic order," or 
"those elements of capitalism."zo 
This proposition is perhaps the most engag-
ing of any presented by recent Dust Bowl 
historians. And the history Worster weaves 
around this line of reasoning is presented so 
compactly that one feels compelled to believe 
it. Yet Worster's panoramic view of American 
culture and the value it places on exploitation· 
tends to compromise his work. For he carries 
his message beyond the boundaries of his 
study and encourages the thought that Dust 
Bowls might occur virtually anywhere, regard-
less of the character of the people and of the 
land. 
Worster's cataclysmic view of American 
culture is pushed relentlessly upon the reader. 
Contending that Americans have "a greater 
resource hunger than others, greater eagerness 
to take risks, and less capacity for restraint," 
Worster concludes that they made a marginal 
land into a Dust Bowl. The Dust Bowl was 
"the inevitable outcome of a culture that 
deliberately, self-consciously, set itself that task 
of dominating and exploiting the land for all it 
was worth. The entirety of the Great Plains is 
threatened: "the region," warns Worster, "may 
be in the most serious ecological trouble it has 
ever seen." And anyone who thinks he is safe 
because he farms not only outside the Great 
Plains but outside the United States altogether 
should take heed of this warning: the expan-
sion of American farming culture "to other 
nations has already begun to create a new 
chain of environmental disasters."Z! 
Worster's forebodings aside, his approach 
persuades his readers to overlook the fact that 
in the Dust Bowl there were natural conditions 
specific to that area. Moreover, it does not 
permit the reader to understand that these 
natural conditions encountered a particular 
farm culture-likewise specific to the area-in 
the 1920s and the 1930s. And that, together, 
they created the Dust Bowl. 
Rather, Worster's approach leads the read-
er to ask: "Why study the Dust Bowl at all?" 
After all, is not American farm culture headed 
toward the "inevitable," the creation of wide-
spread dust bowls and "ecological disasters"? 
For, as Worster himself says, the purpose of the 
book is "to explain why the world is facing a 
future of dust bowls."" 
Yet this conclusion ignores some of the 
research done in the Plains by rural social 
scientists during the 1920s a;d early 1930s.23 
For example, in Oklahoma these researchers 
found a phenomenon that profoundly affected 
the farm economy of their state-a "culture of 
migratoriness." As Sheila Manes describes this 
phenomenon, it was a "peculiar [to this specific 
area), impoverishing system ... that moved 
mostly locally, but also in slightly wider circles, 
back and forth" among several southwestern 
states, including the area that became the Dust 
Bowl.z4 Not only was it made up of numerous 
workers who viewed farming as part-time or 
interim employment, but its volume ebbed and 
flowed with the tide of nonagricultural work in 
the area. Hence, Manes's work (and that of' 
others) shows how this migratoriness com-
bined with other cultural traits peculiar to 
those who farmed in this region to help create 
the ecological disaster called the Dust Bowl; 
farm conditions in the Dust Bowl were not 
only peculiar to this one specific area but also 
to a specific period in time, roughly between 
the two World Wars.zs 
Moreover, these conditions and the farm-
ing practices that created them were clearly 
out of step with the vanguard of farming 
systems being developed elsewhere in the 
Plains by the pure scientists and social scien-
tists who worked for the experiment stations, 
the agricultural colleges, or the USDA itself. 
Their scholarly publications during the twen-
ties and thirties help to explain why a Dust 
Bowl never occurred elsewhere in the Plains. 
They demonstrate clearly how some plains 
states were far more attentive than others to 
recognizing and resolving their specific farm 
problems. 26 
Montana was especially advanced in mak-
ing significant reforms in land conservation 
and management. The publications of M. L. 
Wilson, Elmer Starch, E. ]. Bell, and Dwight 
Sanderson are among the many that explain 
how Montana's public institutions cooperated 
closely with both federal and private agencies 
(like the Rockefeller Foundation) to recognize 
and resolve the particular problems of farmers 
and farming areas in Montana. 27 These efforts 
resulted in new soil conservation technolo-
gies-like the duckfoot cultivator that formed 
a clod rather than a dust mulch, furrow drills 
that listed wheat, shelter belts, dry land 
irrigation systems, strip farming, and farm 
diversification. As Montana historian Robert 
G. Dunbar points out, these soil conservation 
techniques were widely adopted in the north-
central part of the state when the drought of 
the thirties came. 28 
Additionally, scholars might look closely at 
the efforts of the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics to persuade the Great Plains states 
to address their problems. For example, early 
in the 1920s the BAE sought to identify 
"pathological farming areas" in the Great 
Plains. 29 This was official jargon for "diseased" 
areas-those with a combination of natural 
and human factors at work creating a sick 
farming culture. 
Perhaps the BAE should have picked a 
better phrase than pathological farming areas, 
for some states resented its application to 
certain of their sections. The agricultural 
college in Kansas so resented these desig-
nations that it steadfastly refused during the 
1920s to cooperate with the BAE in recogniz-
ing problems peculiar to these areas in Kansas 
and in seeking to solve any recognized prob-
lems. In fact, William Jardine-who served as 
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director of the agricultural experiment station, 
as dean of the college of agriculture, and finally 
as president of Kansas State College-was 
made secretary of agriculture in March 1925 in 
part because President Calvin Coolidge and 
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover knew 
that Jardine would relish firing Henry C. 
Taylor, the man who directed the BAE and 
launched the "pathological farming area" 
efforts. 'o 
One should not belabor the point that 
separates Worster from Manes and the rural 
social scientists who lived in and studied the 
culture of Dust Bowl area residents in the 
1920s and 1930s. But this commentary does 
suggest another reason why our textbook 
writers and other scholars continue to believe 
that the drought created the Dust Bowl: It is 
quite possible that they have not read this 
body of work, or at least have not read it 
carefully. 
This suspicion is furthered by the fact that 
the third book-length history of the Dust Bowl 
to appear in recent years-that of R. Douglas 
Hurt-has no discernible bias running through 
it." Hurt provides such a well-balanced and 
straightforward account that one cannot read 
it and fail to understand the character and 
causes of the Dust Bowl. 
Yet in spite of Hurt's work, not only do the 
misconceptions of the survey text writers 
persist but even specialists in western history 
provide accounts of the Dust Bowl that 
continue to present misconceptions of the 
Dust Bowl, their declarations implying knowl-
edge of Bonnifield, Worster, and Hurt not 
withstanding. Here, a recent book by Richard 
Lowitt, The New Deal and the West, comes to 
mind. 32 Lowitt devotes two chapters to the 
Great Plains, yet the Dust Bowl does not 
appear until near the end of the second of 
these chapters. One encounters it in an 
unusual way. Lowitt explains that throughout 
the Plains "the wind whipped the topsoil into 
great drifts," often causing minor streams to 
disappear "and major ones, such as the Red 
River along the eastern boundary of the 
Dakotas," to become "hardly more than a 
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creek." But, says Lowitt, "the brunt of these 
storms fell on western Kansas, eastern Colora-
do, western Oklahoma, the Texas panhandle, 
and parts of New Mexico. This area soon 
became known as the Dust Bowl, but dust 
swirled over the entire area of the Great 
Plains."" 
Lowitt's choice of words here, ("these 
storms fell on") betrays his lack of understand-
ing of the Dust Bowl. It is his view that 
identical forces were at work throughout the 
Great Plains; it is just that the Dust Bowl got 
the worst of them. Throughout the thirty 
pages of text dedicated to the Great Plains, 
Lowitt fails to find any problems that were 
unusual to the Dust Bowl area. Save for one 
brief paragraph where he dedicates a few 
sentences to soil conservation practices applied 
in the Dust Bowl area, Lowitt makes no effort 
to review the natural or the human conditions 
that were specific to that area. 
Because Lowitt views the problems in the 
Dust Bowl and the Plains as one and the same, 
he is led to draw some peculiar conclusions. He 
says that throughout the Plains there were 
"conditions and practices fostering erosion 
and drought." Just which conditions and 
practices fostered drought we are never told. 
But Lowitt does explore those that fostered 
erosion. Apparently, he agrees with the report 
of the Great Plains Drought Area C<5mmittee, 
which he quotes as saying "the basic cause of 
the present Great Plains situation is our 
attempt to impose upon the region a system of 
agriculture to which the Plains are not adapted 
or to bring into a semi-arid region methods 
which are suitable, on the whole, only for a 
humid region." In fact, Lowitt contends that 
this assumption became "official New Deal 
Gospel." Having coined a phrase, Lowitt then 
proceeds to show how it resulted in only 
"fragmented reforms" in the Plains, another 
phrase of Lowitt's whose meaning one won-
ders about. After all this, one is not surprised 
when he ends his chapters on the Plains by 
asking if the "historic cycle ... of adequate 
rainfall and drought would begin anew."]4 
It is difficult to understand how Lowitt 
arrived at such conclusions in view of his 
statement in a footnote that "the best, most 
balanced and most comprehensive study is by 
R. Douglas Hurt, Dust Bowl," for Hurt's book 
does not support Lowitt's contentions. J5 Hurt 
begins by carefully delineating the Dust Bowl 
area. Having clearly established these bounda-
ries, he then shows how dust blowing occurred 
throughout the Plains as far back as recorded 
settlement reveals. This being the case, Hurt 
closes his first chapter by observing that in the 
Dust Bowl area these storms were exacerbated 
by "the adoption of a new [my emphasis] 
agricultural technology."]6 In the second chap-
ter, aptly titled "Causes of the Dust Bowl," 
Hurt takes great care to identify the "composi-
tion" of the "major soil groups" specific to the 
area that, together with "the settlement of 
man, were responsible for the creation of the 
Dust Bowl." 
Only after carefully examining the Dust 
Bowl's soils and the special new agricultural 
technologies employed there during the 1920s 
does Hurt move on to provide a view of 
broader issues, such as the climate of the Plains 
in general and the federal homesteading poli-
cies. Even here, Hurt provides insights into 
agricultural techniques peculiar to the Dust 
Bowl area. For instance, he draws upon Leslie 
Hewes's work on suitcase farming to explain 
how this type of farmer was endemic to the 
Dust Bowl area. He had "flexibility. If a crop 
failed, a suitcase farmer still had another 
income, and his livelihood did not depend 
upon him remaining on the land. If a wheat 
crop did not look profitable, a suitcase farmer 
could abandon his fields to the mercy of the 
wind. When suitcase farmers abandoned their 
land, they seldom returned to apply the proper 
soil conservation techniques to keep it under 
control."" Hurt then proceeds to provide a 
detailed analysis of how, beginning in the late 
1930s, farmers worked with federal, state, and 
local officials to create particular agricultural 
technologies designed to meet problems specif-
ic to the Dust Bowl area. By the 1950s, says 
Hurt, "the Dust Bowl farmers understood the 
relationship between soil conservation and 
successful farming. "38 
As a result of Hurt's study-and of others 
discussed above-we now have a clear under-
standing of the parameters and causes of the 
Dust Bowl of the 1930s. Those who write 
textbooks of American history and mono-
graphs on the Great Plains need only to take 
heed of their contributions. Beyond that, 
scholars might also want to note that recent 
Dust Bowl histories provide instruction in the 
problem of marginality in modernizing socie-
ties: they show us how marginal people operate 
in a marginal economy. Here are people whose 
abilities do not square with the needs of 
modernizing societies-their abilities do not fit 
into the emerging technostructure. They are 
therefore left to carve out for themselves a life 
in the margins-those areas of the ecostructure 
where modern economic institutions do not 
choose to venture. These are usually areas 
where the returns are small and the risks are 
high-such as in the Dust Bowl. 
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